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Abstract 13 
While several measures have been suggested to address unethical practices within the built 14 
environment, it remains unclear whether some stakeholders are more able to influence improvement 15 
in unethical practices than others, and if so whether such phenomenon manifests similarly or 16 
differently in different national contexts. This study pioneers the exploration of:  whether different 17 
built environment profession stakeholders (i.e. the practitioner/individual professional, the 18 
practitioner’s organization/company, and the professional body/association) have different abilities to 19 
influence improvement (i.e. positive change) in unethical practices; and subsequently whether such 20 
phenomenon manifests differently in different national contexts. The study used cross-sectional 21 
surveys of built environment surveying professionals in three countries: Ghana, Nigeria and Tanzania. 22 
The findings revealed that there are significant differences in the abilities of stakeholders to influence 23 
improvement in unethical practices like political interference, and discrimination and nepotism.   The 24 
findings further revealed that differences in stakeholder ability to influence improvement in unethical 25 
practices can manifest differently in different national contexts. The implication is that, in different 26 
national contexts, specific stakeholders could play a leading role in efforts to address unethical 27 
practices in which they are more capable of influencing improvement.  28 
 29 
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Introduction 31 
While the built environment sector of no particular nation may be able to claim perfection in terms of 32 
the absence of unethical practices, there are indications that the prevalence of unethical practices is 33 
not uniform across countries (Transparency International, 2014).   34 
 35 
Regardless of the disparities in the prevalence of unethical practices among market sectors, there is   36 
acknowledgment that these practices in general have dire repercussions for the health of industries, 37 
professions and eventually the growth of a country (see Schwab, 2013; Runde et al., 2014). Globally, 38 
various estimates put the cost of corruption to be in excess of US $1 trillion (Runde et al., 2014). For 39 
the construction and property sectors, the costs resulting from unethical practices are not only in the 40 
form of colossal financial losses but also often in human life (e.g. deaths resulting from the collapse of 41 
structures due to sub-standard construction (CIOB, 2010). Clearly, the detrimental impact of unethical 42 
practices presents a strong case for their mitigation, especially in the built environment where 43 
unethical practices are pervasive. 44 
 45 
Generally, it is recognised that unethical practices are a complex and multi-faceted problem which 46 
require appropriate mitigation efforts by several stakeholders at various levels e.g. profession, 47 
industry, national, regional and global. At the level of professions, the role of key stakeholders such as 48 
practitioners, their firms/organisations, and professional bodies cannot be neglected. While the 49 
contribution of each of these stakeholders towards addressing unethical practices is interconnected, it 50 
is also reasonable to state that for some unethical practices, individual practitioners by themselves 51 
may have limited influence in bringing about improvement (i.e. positive change). For such practices, 52 
the firms/organisations or the professional bodies may be more able to influence improvement. The 53 
notion of different industry stakeholders being able to influence improvement at varying extents runs 54 
parallel to the view in risk management that some risks are more easily mitigated by some parties 55 
more than others and therefore the recommended practice that risk items should be transferred to or 56 
held by the party that is most capable of dealing with them (CIOB, 2010). Although this notion may 57 
so hold true and perhaps be fundamental in addressing unethical professional practices in the built 58 
environment, it is also important to clarify that an argument is not being made for various 59 
stakeholders to be boxed into solely or exclusively focussing on addressing some particular unethical 60 
practices. Rather, the notion of some stakeholders being better placed to influence improvement in 61 
some unethical practices is being presented. This argument is presented from the standpoint that some 62 
stakeholders could consequently act as ‘champions’ or ‘frontrunners’ to spearhead efforts to address 63 
unethical practices while others continue to lend support in a unified manner. 64 
 65 
While such an approach could be useful given the complex and multi-faceted nature of the problem of 66 
unethical practices, the built environment lacks any empirical study that seeks to ascertain the 67 
differences in stakeholder influences in addressing unethical practices. Such empirical inquiry is 68 
necessary to provide a sound basis for guided action against unethical practices so that mitigation 69 
efforts are appropriately applied. This study therefore explores whether different stakeholders of the 70 
built environment surveying profession have different abilities to influence improvement (i.e. positive 71 
change) in unethical practices; and whether such a phenomenon manifests differently in different 72 
national contexts. 73 
 74 
Literature review 75 
As a term that is very difficult to define, various researchers have tried to give meaning to the word 76 
‘ethics’ by describing it in several ways. According to Mason (2009), ethics broadly describe the way 77 
in which one looks at and understands life, in terms of good and bad or right and wrong. Sohail and 78 
Cavill (2008, p. 730) indicated that “it is the study of what one ought to do (actions and decisions) 79 
when faced with ethical dilemmas and how he/she does it, both as part of an organization and as an 80 
individual”. Delbridge (2000) defined ethics in a broader way to include: a system of moral principles, 81 
by which human actions and proposals may be judged good or bad, or right or wrong; the rules of 82 
conduct recognized in respect of a particular class of human actions; and moral principles, as of an 83 
individual. The issue of ethics continues to be topical, with particular emphasis on unethical practices 84 
in the construction sector. This section is dedicated to reviewing literature on ethics and it is in two 85 
parts:  1) highlighting the prevalence of unethical practices in the construction sector; and 2) various 86 
forms of unethical practices in the sector.  87 
Prevalence of unethical practices in construction  88 
As a global industry, the construction industry has seen contractors and consultants operating across 89 
international markets (Moodley et al., 2008). If properly harnessed, such an industry can make a 90 
significant impact on the economic well-being of citizens and countries as a whole (Mukumbwa and 91 
Muya, 2013). Though the construction industry has become a key driver to the economic growth of 92 
many countries, it does so with numerous ethical challenges (Ho, 2011). As a matter of fact, code of 93 
ethics has become increasingly important to the construction industries in most developed and 94 
developing countries worldwide (Oladinrin and Ho, 2016). Oladinrin and Ho (2016) further iterated 95 
that, though the code of ethics exists, it has not contributed much to the reduction in the intensity of 96 
ethical problems within the industry, probably because of the domineering effect of unethical 97 
practices which is restricting its progress.  98 
Unethical practices have the tendency to impose negative costs at personal, group and organizational 99 
levels, and an organization that is in the constant behavior of creating such negative behaviors will 100 
encounter a diminishing market for its services and withdrawal of public approval (Poon and Hoxley, 101 
2010). This has been the case of the global construction industry because of the inter-organizational 102 
relationship that exists between the project team members (Poon and Hoxley, 2010). Researchers have 103 
studied the issue of ethical behavior in the construction industry and have reported that there are clear 104 
cases of unethical practices during the delivery of construction projects (May et al., 2001; Vee and 105 
Skitmore, 2003; Seun et al., 2007; Adnan et al., 2012; Mukumbwa and Muya, 2013). The following 106 
sections discuss examples of unethical practices in the construction sector.  107 
Common unethical practices in the construction industry 108 
Different professions have different reputations as far as ethical behaviors are concerned (Vee and 109 
Skitmore, 2003). Unethical practices within the corporate and operational levels of the construction 110 
industry have become commonplace, making the industry no stranger to the issues of ethical 111 
malpractices (Oladinrin and Ho., 2014). Issues relating to construction faults and ethical malpractices 112 
are often directed towards all the parties who are directly involved in the execution of such projects 113 
(Adnan et al., 2012). Examples of commonly reported unethical practices in the construction industry 114 
are discussed below. 115 
Fraud, Bribery and Corruption 116 
Defining corruption has always been a problem because what one perceives to be a corrupt practice 117 
may not be so by another person. However, over the years, one definition that has received attention is 118 
that given by Shakantu (2006, p. 43), who defined corruption as the “offering, giving, receiving or 119 
soliciting of anything of value to influence the action of an official in the procurement or selection 120 
process or in contract execution”.  Fraud, bribery and corruption is without doubt a pervasive trait in 121 
doing business, with a growing worldwide concern over a high level of corrupt activities among 122 
corporate organizations of which construction is key (Arewa and Farrell, 2015). Vee and Skitmore 123 
(2003, p. 119) presented fraud to indicate “deceit, trickery, sharp practice, or breach of confidence, by 124 
which it is sought to gain some unfair or dishonest advantage”. The construction industry is frequently 125 
noted as one of the most fraudulent and corrupt industries worldwide (Kenny, 2009). According to 126 
Arewa and Farrell (2015, p. 61), corrupt practices may normally manifest in the form of “bribery, 127 
embezzlement, extortion, influence peddling, unlawful gratuity, favor, commission, nepotism and 128 
illegal payments”. Research on fraud, bribery and corruption has been extensively reported in 129 
literature (see Vee and Skitmore, 2003; Bowen et al., 2007; Kenny, 2009; Osei-Tutu et al., 2010; 130 
Ameh and Odusami, 2010; Bowen et al., 2012; Liao, 2013; Mukumbwa and Muya, 2013; Le et al., 131 
2014; Arewa and Farrell, 2015; Loosemore and Lim, 2015; Ameyaw et al., 2017). 132 
Conflict of interest 133 
Conflict of interest if pursued, could keep professionals from meeting   their professional duties (Vee 134 
and Skitmore, 2003). This ethical malpractice is defined to mean “a situation in which someone in a 135 
position of trust, has competing professional or personal interests which could make it difficult to 136 
fulfil his or her duties impartially” (Bowen et al., 2007, p. 634). Liao (2013, p. 88) also defined 137 
conflict of interest to mean “any situation in which an individual or corporation is in a position to 138 
exploit a professional or official capacity in some way for their personal or corporate benefit”. To the 139 
engineering professionals, conflict of interest is closely related to impartiality, and it is very necessary 140 
that one does not encroach upon conflicts that may bias their judgements in technical aspects of 141 
reviewing a design, or in the construction of a project (Liao, 2013). 142 
Clear cases of conflict of interests are presented in literature (Ameyaw et al., 2017). It is very much 143 
mentioned among construction procurement (Bowen, 2007; Osei-Tutu et al., 2010), and it is defined 144 
as a clash between the interest of the client organization and personal interest of an official in the 145 
client organization (Ameyaw et al., 2017). Bowen et al. (2007) indicated that it is better to declare all 146 
potential instances of conflicts of interests before proceeding to undertake any projects. This ethical 147 
malpractice has been mentioned in the construction industry of several countries including Australia 148 
(Vee and Skitmore, 2003), Zambia (Mukumbwa and Muya, 2013), Nigeria (Ameh and Odusami, 149 
2010), Ghana (Osei-Tutu et al., 2010), among others. 150 
Unfair conduct 151 
According to Loosemore and Lim (2015), fairness has a close relationship with ethical concepts and 152 
justice. It involves “treating people consistently, impartially and equally without favoritism, 153 
discrimination or improper prejudices; not taking unfair advantage of people’s mistakes or ignorance; 154 
and fully considering peoples’ rights, interests and perspectives” (Loosemore and Lim, 2015, p. 310). 155 
Bowen et al. (2007) indicated that these unfair conducts may occur in competitions, contracts, staff 156 
promotion/dismissal/demotion, and in business practice. According to Ameyaw et al. (2017), this 157 
ethical malpractice may also be termed as ‘fronting’, and it may manifest itself when officials within 158 
government agencies or client organizations create front companies to obtain construction contracts. 159 
Such companies obtain unfair or illegal benefits in awarding public contracts because of the owners’ 160 
powerful positions in government (Ameyaw et al., 2017).  161 
Collusion  162 
Collusion is contrary to the principle of free competition because it only benefits the parties to the 163 
collusive agreement at the expense of those who are not privy to the agreement (Bowen et al., 2007). 164 
Ameyaw et al. (2017) indicated that collusive tendering and bid rigging are referenced alike, possibly 165 
because it is a secret agreement between two or more parties engaged in a fraudulent activity. This 166 
ethical malpractice though serious has not received much attention from the research community. 167 
However, for those studies that have addressed this issue, it has been revealed that collusion is very 168 
serious and should be addressed. Available literature has revealed that this issue is evidenced by 169 
tender rigging that predominantly transpire at bid evaluation and tendering phases of project 170 
developments (see Vee and Skitmore, 2003; Bowen et al., 2007; Kenny, 2009;  Osei-Tutu et al., 2010; 171 
Ameh and Odusami, 2010; Bowen et al., 2012; Liao, 2013; Mukumbwa and Muya, 2013; Le et al., 172 
2014; Arewa and Farrell, 2015; Loosemore and Lim, 2015; Ameyaw et al., 2017). 173 
Other unethical practices in the construction industry 174 
In addition to the commonly encountered unethical practices previously described, literature further 175 
reports on other unethical practices in the construction industry such as: failure to protect public 176 
health, safety and welfare; mishandling of sensitive data (e.g. revealing or discussing confidential 177 
information); failure to protect the environment; improper relations with other parties (e.g. excessive 178 
gifts); abuse of company resources; abuse of client resources; misrepresentation of competence; and 179 
political interference (Jackson, 2004; Kang, 2009; Kang et al., 2017). 180 
 181 
Research methodology 182 
Aligned with the study’s aim, a quantitative research strategy, particularly a survey was used. The 183 
choice of this strategy is supported by its suitability for obtaining a generalized view of a phenomenon 184 
(Fellows and Liu, 2008; Creswell, 2014), which in this study is stakeholders’ ability to influence 185 
improvement (i.e. bring about positive change) in unethical practices. Consequently, three cross-186 
sectional surveys were conducted in Ghana, Nigeria, and Tanzania. The administration of surveys in 187 
the different locations was mainly to enable further exploration of the phenomenon in terms of 188 
whether it could manifest differently in different national contexts.  189 
 190 
Survey design 191 
A questionnaire was designed for the survey and it consisted of two main sections: respondent 192 
demographic information; and respondents’ assessment of the extent to which different built 193 
environment stakeholders (i.e. the practitioner/ individual professional, practitioner’s 194 
organization/company, and professional body/association) can influence improvement in unethical 195 
practices.  196 
 197 
Section 1: respondent demographic information. This section captured respondent demographic 198 
information including: professional role; highest level of education; and professional experience. 199 
 200 
Section 2: assessment of the extent to which different built environment stakeholders can influence 201 
improvement in unethical practices. There are several stakeholders within the built environment and it 202 
is not practicable to survey them all in a single study. As such this section focused on three important 203 
stakeholders: the practitioner/ individual professional; practitioner’s organization/company (i.e. 204 
practitioners’ employer); and the professional body/association (i.e. the national professional 205 
body/association related to the practitioner’s profession). The assessment of the extent to which each 206 
stakeholder can influence improvement in unethical practices was done by relying on the judgement 207 
of the practitioners. This approach was used because practitioners, through personal knowledge of 208 
themselves, their organizations, and through their knowledge and interactions with their professional 209 
association are well placed to provide credible assessment of the extent to which they, their 210 
organization and professional association can influence improvement in unethical practices. 211 
Consequently, this section requested built environment professionals to rate the extent to which they 212 
perceive that they (personally), their organization and their national professional association can 213 
influence improvement (i.e. bring about positive change) in the unethical practices. A five-point 214 
Likert scale (1 = Not at all; 2 = Low; 3 = Moderate; 4 = High; 5 = Very High) was used. Drawing 215 
from the review of literature, the unethical practices that were examined in the study are: failure to 216 
protect public health, safety and welfare; collusion; mishandling of sensitive data (e.g.  leakages); 217 
production of fraudulent documents (e.g. invoices & claims); failure to protect environment; bribery; 218 
improper relations with other parties (e.g. excessive gifts); abuse of company resources; abuse of 219 
client resources; discrimination and nepotism; misrepresentation of competence; and political 220 
interference. The questionnaire is presented in Appendix A. 221 
Survey administration 222 
To enable exploration of the phenomenon of different built environment stakeholders having varying 223 
ability to influence improvement in unethical practices, the survey was administered to built 224 
environment surveying professionals (i.e. quantity surveyors, property/estate valuers, and land 225 
surveyors) within three study locations. The Commonwealth Association of Surveying and Land 226 
Economy (CASLE) (www.casle.org), which is an association for built environment surveying 227 
professionals in the Commonwealth, holds annual conferences in conjunction with the surveying 228 
professional bodies in Commonwealth countries. These conferences bring together surveying 229 
professionals (usually predominantly from the country of the conference venue) to share information 230 
and discuss issues that are relevant to the surveying profession. Considering the difficulty in obtaining 231 
participation in built environment surveys, the CASLE conferences presented a useful platform to 232 
administer the survey. A cross-sectional survey was thus administered to delegates at the CASLE 233 
conferences held in Ghana, Nigeria, and Tanzania from 2015-2017.  The survey yielded a total of 266 234 
useable responses comprising 121 from Ghana, 86 from Nigeria, and 59 from Tanzania. 235 
Data analysis  236 
The data from the retrieved questionnaire were coded into IBM SPSS Statistic version 23 for analysis. 237 
Descriptive statistical analyses (e.g. frequencies, mean and standard deviation) and inferential 238 
statistical analysis - one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) – were performed on the collected data. 239 
The ANOVA was applied to the aggregated sample from the three locations (i.e. 266 responses) in 240 
order to address the primary research objective of exploring whether there are differences in 241 
stakeholder ability to influence improvement in unethical practices. In order to further explore 242 
whether such differences could manifest differently or similarly in different national contexts, the 243 
ANOVA was also applied to each country-specific sample. ANOVA was used due to its suitability for 244 
assessing differences in responses for different groups (Field, 2013).  245 
 246 
Findings 247 
The findings of the study are presented below under three sub-headings: respondent demographic 248 
information; differences in stakeholder ability to influence improvement in unethical practices; and 249 
country-specific differences in stakeholder ability to influence improvement in unethical practices.  250 
Respondent demographic information 251 
The respondents were drawn from three countries (Ghana, Nigeria and Tanzania), and their combined 252 
demographic information is shown in Table 1.  253 
 254 
[Insert Table 1] 255 
Table 1 shows that the respondents occupied various roles ranging from Land Surveyors/Geomatic 256 
Engineers (40.6%), Estate Surveyors/Valuers (28.6%), and Quantity Surveyors (26.3%). The majority 257 
of respondents (i.e. 85.7%) hold a bachelor’s or postgraduate degree, and over half of the respondents 258 
have more than 10 years of professional experience. Overall, based on the demographic information, 259 
the respondents are sufficiently well placed to respond to the subject of inquiry. 260 
 Differences in stakeholder ability to influence improvement in unethical practices 261 
For each of the unethical practices examined, respondents rated the extent to which they can influence 262 
improvement, the extent to which they perceive that their companies can influence improvement, and 263 
the extent to which they perceive that their professional associations can influence improvement. 264 
Table 2 shows the mean scores, standard deviations and standard errors of the twelve unethical 265 
practices that were assessed.  266 
 267 
From Table 2, ‘company’ is seen as the topmost ranked stakeholder that is able to influence 268 
improvement in 11 out of the 12 unethical practices examined. Among the unethical practices are: 269 
‘failure to protect public health, safety and welfare’ (mean score (MS) = 3.32, standard deviation (SD) 270 
= 1.314); ‘mishandling of sensitive data’ (MS = 3.30, SD = 1.296); ‘abuse of company resources’ 271 
(MS = 3.27, SD = 1.350); and ‘bribery’ (MS = 3.22, SD = 1.373). The professional association 272 
emerged as the topmost stakeholder that can influence improvement in ‘political interference’ (MS = 273 
3.34, SD = 1.373), while the individual professional did not emerge as the topmost stakeholder for 274 
any of the unethical practices. 275 
 276 
While the ranking gives an indication of the stakeholders’ relative ability to influence improvements 277 
in unethical practices, inferential statistical analysis is required in order to establish whether the 278 
differences in stakeholder ability to influence improvement are significant. A one-way analysis of 279 
variance (ANOVA) test was conducted to determine if there are any statistically significant 280 
differences in the means between groups (i.e. the individual professionals, the professional’s 281 
companies, and the professional association) in terms of the ability to influence improvement in the 282 
unethical practices. From the one-way ANOVA test, the combined sample revealed that different 283 
stakeholders are perceived to have significantly different abilities to influence improvement in three 284 
out of the 12 unethical practices: abuse of company resources; discrimination and nepotism; and 285 
political interference (as shown by Table 3). Tukey post hoc comparisons (as shown by Table 4) was 286 
further conducted to determine the differences in the stakeholders’ ability to influence improvement in 287 
the three unethical practices. The post hoc comparison is frequently used in conjunction with ANOVA 288 
to determine which pairs of groups show statistically significant mean differences (De Vaus, 2002). 289 
The Tukey’s test detects a pairwise comparison with means that are significantly different from each 290 
other at a 0.05 significance level (Skibniewski, 2009). 291 
 292 
From the Tukey post hoc test, the differences in the mean scores for the various groups were 293 
determined and the mean differences are shown in Table 4. The pairs of groups which showed 294 
statistically significant mean differences at 0.05 significance level are shown in the superscript ‘a’.  295 
Table 4 further shows that the mean score of organization ability to influence improvement in the 296 
‘abuse of company resources’ is significantly higher than that of the professional association (mean 297 
difference (MD) = 0.405, p = 0.003). The comparison of the mean score of the individual professional 298 
with that of the organization and professional association yielded no significant difference. The post 299 
hoc comparison in Table 4 further reveals that the comparison of the mean score of organization 300 
ability to influence improvement in ‘discrimination and nepotism’ is significantly higher than that of 301 
the individual professional (MD = 0.347, p = 0.022). The comparison of the mean score of the 302 
professional association with that of the organization and individual professional yielded no 303 
significant differences. Finally, Table 4 shows that the mean scores of the ability of the organization 304 
(MD = 0.670, p < 0.001) and the ability of the professional association (MD = 0.717, p < 0.001) to 305 
influence improvement in political interference is significantly greater than that of the individual 306 
professional. 307 
 308 
[Insert Table 2] 309 
[Insert Table 3] 310 
[Insert Table 4] 311 
 312 
Country-specific differences in stakeholder ability to influence improvement in unethical practices 313 
Country-specific ANOVA analysis was conducted to further explore whether the observed differences 314 
in stakeholder ability to influence unethical practices manifest similarly or differently in the three 315 
survey locations: Ghana, Nigeria, and Tanzania. The results are in the following sections. 316 
 317 
Differences in stakeholder ability to influence improvement in unethical practices (Ghana sample) 318 
The one-way ANOVA test conducted for the Ghana sample revealed that different stakeholders are 319 
perceived to have significantly different abilities to influence improvement in 3 unethical practices as 320 
follows: abuse of company resources; discrimination and nepotism; and political interference (as 321 
shown by Table 5). The Tukey post hoc test multiple comparisons for the Ghana sample ANOVA is 322 
shown in Table 6. The Tukey post hoc test revealed differences in the means for the various groups.  323 
Table 6 shows that the mean score of company’s ability to influence improvement in the ‘abuse of 324 
company resources’ is significantly greater (MD = 0.719, p < 0.001) than that of the professional 325 
association. With regards to ‘discrimination and nepotism’, the mean score of company’s ability to 326 
influence improvement is also significantly greater than that of the individual professional. 327 
Concerning ‘political interference’, the ability of the company (MD = 0.992, p < 0.001) and the 328 
professional association (MD = 0.688, p = 0.001) to influence improvement is significantly greater 329 
than that of the individual professional.  330 
[Insert Table 5] 331 
[Insert Table 6] 332 
 333 
Differences in stakeholder ability to influence improvement in unethical practices (Nigeria sample) 334 
As shown by Table 7, the one-way ANOVA test conducted for the Nigeria sample revealed that 335 
different stakeholders are perceived to have significantly different ability to influence improvement in 336 
only one unethical practice (i.e. political interference). Table 8 which shows the Tukey post hoc test 337 
multiple comparisons reveal that the mean score of the professional association’s ability to influence 338 
improvement in political interference is significantly greater (MD = 0.726, p = 0.001) than that of the 339 
individual professional.    340 
[Insert Table 7] 341 
[Insert Table 8] 342 
 343 
Differences in stakeholder ability to influence improvement in unethical practices (Tanzania sample) 344 
Like the Nigeria sample, the one-way ANOVA test conducted for the Tanzania sample revealed that 345 
different stakeholders are perceived to have significantly different ability to influence improvement in 346 
only one unethical practice (i.e. political interference). This is shown in Table 9. The Tukey post hoc 347 
test multiple comparisons (shown by Table 10) shows that the mean score of the ability of the 348 
professional association to influence improvement in ‘political interference’ is significantly greater 349 
(MD= 0.761, p-value=0.010) than that of the individual professional.    350 
 351 
 [Insert Table 9] 352 
[Insert Table 10] 353 
 354 
Discussion 355 
Discussion based on combined results 356 
Over the years the issue of ethics has received much attention among companies, professional 357 
associations, and individual professionals (Perry et al., 2014; Joyce, 2014). The combined results of 358 
the study show that, out of the three stakeholders, ‘company’ emerged as the topmost stakeholder that 359 
is able to influence improvement (i.e. positive change) in the examined unethical practices, followed 360 
by the professional association, with the individual professional having a relatively limited ability to 361 
influence improvement. The results of the combined sample ANOVA also revealed significant 362 
differences in stakeholder ability to influence improvement in ‘abuse of company resources’, 363 
‘discrimination and nepotism’, and ‘political interference’.  364 
 365 
Abuse of company resources 366 
Organizations should act to protect their assets against misuse and abuse by employees. Such assets 367 
may be physical, intellectual and electronic or digital in nature. According to the Association of 368 
Certified Fraud Examiners’ (ACFEs) 2016 Report to the Nations, abuse of company resources is 369 
considered as the most common form of occupational fraud, and it occurs in approximately 83% of all 370 
unethical cases reported. From the finding of this study, it is evident that the respondents perceive 371 
organization to be more able to influence improvement in this unethical practice than the other 372 
stakeholders. In most instances, client databases with personal and financial information, internal 373 
documentations which detail out trade secrets, contents and technologies produced can be exposed, 374 
opening the real possibility for data to be misused, either intentionally for personal gain, or 375 
inadvertently. Maicibi and Yahaya (2013) and Wilks (2011) have reported this unethical practice to be 376 
an issue which is of a major concern to organizations. It is a practice that is very difficult to curb, 377 
especially on individual or professional association basis. There is therefore the need for a collective 378 
action by an entire company to be able to control such practices. These acts of misconducts are vastly 379 
reported in other industries, apart from construction, a typical example being the ICT (Kernel, 2011). 380 
Since it manifests itself in different ways among different stakeholders, there is the need to identify 381 
different ways to address it. It causes a huge challenge to organizational and societal development 382 
(Maicibi and Yahaya, 2013), and organizations should seek to lead efforts to design and implement 383 
measures to tackle the abuse of company resources by employees. In most instances, organizations 384 
can put in place measures like identifying common asset misappropriation schemes (e.g. skimming, 385 
billing schemes, and information theft), analytical reviews, independent checks, segregation of 386 
functions and duties and access limitation and authorization controls to check the misuse of company 387 
assets. However, such measures may be more likely to be effective if their design were to include 388 
some level of employee involvement so that employees would take some ownership of the measures.  389 
Discrimination and nepotism 390 
Discrimination and nepotism are often seen in actions which actors may not consider as unethical 391 
(Sezer, 2015). These unethical practices if encouraged in companies, among professional associations 392 
and amongst individuals can cause great feelings of resentment. The findings of this study revealed 393 
that the respondents perceive companies to be more able to influence improvement in discrimination 394 
and nepotism than the individual professional. Nepotism is favoritism that is shown to relatives by 395 
individuals in a position of authority (Pelletier and Bligh, 2008). This means that as an individual 396 
professional, there is always the temptation of favoring a family member or a close ally when it comes 397 
to providing a service. Such individuals if left unchecked may always prefer to fill vacancies in the 398 
companies in which they work with people they are very much familiar with. In most instances, 399 
companies are seen to be well positioned to have the needed structures in place to check against these 400 
unethical acts. This means that, in a company where nepotism is very common, there must be clear 401 
policies and practices against such acts. When organizations fail to enforce their anti-discrimination 402 
and anti-nepotism policies with consistency, they expose themselves to liability. For instance, Büte 403 
(2011) found that within the Turkish banking sector, nepotism had a significant negative effect on 404 
intention of employees to quit the job, job satisfaction, organizational commitment, and human 405 
resource management practices. Furthermore, in the Turkish Police Organization, it is reported that 406 
the most essential problems encountered stem from discrimination and nepotism (Mutlu, 2000). Mutlu 407 
(2000) further reported that though the police organization had its own culture, appointments, 408 
promotions, and the honoring system were left in the hands of individuals who could easily be 409 
manipulated by political organizations. Addressing discrimination and nepotism can be controversial 410 
and difficult. In view of this, organizations should seek to design and enforce measures that would 411 
address discrimination and nepotism within businesses and in cross-business interactions. 412 
Organizations should not leave efforts to address discrimination and nepotism to individuals but 413 
should have systems or procedures in place to help detect such practices and encourage individuals to 414 
voice out acts of discrimination (Good Practice Note, 2006).  415 
 416 
Political interference 417 
The findings of the study show that the professional association and company are perceived as being 418 
more able to influence improvement in political interference than the individual professional. Politics 419 
plays a key role in the procurement of construction projects. This is because several large projects 420 
undertaken in different countries are government sponsored projects. This therefore creates the needed 421 
room for governments to politically interfere in such projects (Mukumbwa and Muya, 2013). Political 422 
interference in unethical practices within the construction industry is greatly seen in what is termed 423 
‘fronting’ (Bowen et al., 2007; de Jong et al., 2009; Ameyaw et al., 2017). According to Ameyaw et 424 
al. (2017, p. 3), ‘fronting occurs when officials within government agencies or client organizations 425 
create front companies to obtain construction contracts’. de Jong et al. (2009) iterated that such 426 
companies obtain unfair benefits in awarding public contracts because of the owners’ powerful 427 
positions in government. In Ghana for instance, Ameyaw et al. (2017) revealed that high political 428 
connections were used to enhance secrecy in the award of public contracts. Ameyaw et al. (2017) 429 
further indicated that individuals did not report corrupt practices because of the fear of dismissal (or 430 
other occupational penalties) that may be imposed by their employers on them. There is also the fear 431 
that if such an unethical practice is conducted by an official with high political influence, the whistle 432 
blower may not be well protected, leaving him and the family exposed to danger in the future. The 433 
inference drawn from this finding is that professional bodies and organizations may be more capable 434 
of influencing improvements in political interference than the individual practitioner because the 435 
individual practitioner could more easily become a victim or target of political 436 
victimization/persecution. Hence, professional bodies and organizations could champion efforts to 437 
tackle political interference within the industry. 438 
Discussion of results on country specific basis 439 
On country-specific basis, the ANOVA revealed some differences as well as similarity in the findings. 440 
For all the three samples the professional association is perceived as being more able to influence 441 
improvement in ‘political interference’ than the individual professional. However, within the Ghana 442 
sample only, organization is also perceived as being more able to influence improvement in ‘political 443 
interference’ than the individual professional. Furthermore, within the Ghana sample only, significant 444 
differences emerged regarding stakeholder ability to influence improvement in ‘abuse of company 445 
resources’ and ‘discrimination and nepotism’.  446 
According to Christie et al. (2003), responses to questions of an ethical nature from any particular 447 
group of individuals from any country are a function of multiple constructs. It is worth noting that 448 
such differences are possible and may stem from the differences in culture, organizational behaviors 449 
or dynamics across the countries, among others. Several studies have shown that ethical behavior 450 
varies cross-culturally (Arnold et al., 2007). For instance, Ahmed et al. (2003) found that while there 451 
was a basic agreement on ethical business practices, differences were present in respondents’ 452 
tolerance to damages caused by a particular unethical behavior. Jackson (2000) believed that the 453 
structure of ethical judgements varied by countries, and so conducted a study to prove this. The 454 
findings of his study revealed that managers’ ethical judgements were influenced by country specific 455 
cultural differences.  In the light of organizational dynamics, Kuntz et al. (2013) indicated that the 456 
extent to which an organization exhibits ethical capability is contingent upon the interplay of 457 
competencies and behaviors of incumbents, the organizational infrastructure, and the ethical stance of 458 
organizational leaders. It is therefore very likely that across countries, individuals and organizations 459 
may share different ethical principles. Vitell and Hidalgo (2006, p. 31) therefore suggested that “as 460 
businesses have globally expanded, the study of ethics has become increasingly important due to the 461 
different cultural/country specific environments in which global businesses operate on a daily basis”. 462 
Hence, as countries differ greatly in terms of their levels of economic development, legal-political 463 
systems, cultural standards, and expectations concerning business conduct, decision makers who 464 
operate in other countries and negotiate with the business people from such countries should take into 465 
consideration the ethical stance of such individuals and their businesses in order to learn to trade 466 
cautiously (Vitell and Hidalgo, 2006).   467 
In summary, the empirical realities revealed by the country-specific analyses demonstrate that the 468 
phenomenon regarding differences in stakeholder ability to influence improvement in unethical 469 
practices can indeed manifest similarly as well as differently across different countries. More 470 
importantly, what that implies is that measures designed to tackle unethical practices need to also 471 
consider local contextual issues within a particular country rather than simply adopting or ‘borrowing’ 472 
measures from other contexts which may eventually not be effective. Nonetheless, within the confines 473 
of this study, across the three study locations, the professional association could be a better champion 474 
for spearheading efforts to address political interference within the surveying profession. 475 
 476 
Conclusions 477 
The built environment is notorious for the prevalence of unethical practices and while concerted effort 478 
by all stakeholders is needed to address such practices, some stakeholders within the sector may be 479 
more capable to lead change or influence improvement. This study has examined: whether different 480 
built environment profession stakeholders, particularly the surveying professional, the professional’s 481 
company, and the professional association, have different abilities to influence improvement in 482 
unethical practices; and whether such phenomenon manifests differently in different national contexts. 483 
The results from the study demonstrate that for some unethical practices there are significant 484 
differences in the ability of stakeholders to influence improvement. Such unethical practices are 485 
‘abuse of company resources’, ‘discrimination and nepotism’, and ‘political interference’.  The results 486 
also show that the differences in stakeholder ability to influence improvement can manifest similarly 487 
and differently in different national contexts. The results hold significant practical implications in the 488 
sense that stakeholders that are more able to influence improvement in an unethical practice should 489 
spearhead efforts aimed at addressing those unethical practices. Within the specific context of the 490 
three study locations, professional bodies could spearhead efforts to address political interference 491 
within the surveying profession or more broadly within the built environment sector in those 492 
locations. As shown from this study that differences in stakeholder ability to influence improvement 493 
in unethical practices can manifest differently in different national contexts, it is imperative that 494 
further studies of this nature are undertaken in other countries in order to understand what pertains in 495 
each specific country. It is based on such studies that tailored efforts to address unethical practices can 496 
be designed and implemented within a country. Such studies could also eventually inform the 497 
development of a tool to assist companies and professionals to navigate ethical issues in different 498 
countries. 499 
Additionally, a limitation of this study is that it was restricted to built environment surveying 500 
professionals within three countries. Further studies involving other built environment professions 501 
could yield additional empirical realities to broaden understanding of various stakeholders’ ability to 502 
address unethical practices within the construction sector. 503 
 504 
Acknowledgement 505 
Appreciation is extended to the Commonwealth Association of Surveying and Land Economy for the 506 
assistance given in data collection. 507 
 508 
References 509 
Adnan, H., Hashim, N., Yusuwan, N.M., and Ahmad, N. (2012). “Ethical issues in the construction 510 
industry: Contractor’s perspective.” Procedia Soc. Behav. Sci., 35, 719-727. 511 
Ahmed, M., Cheung, K., and Wichenseher, J. (2003). “Business students’ perception of ethics and 512 
moral judgment: A cross-cultural study.” J. Bus. Ethics, 43(1/2), 89-102. 513 
Ameh, O.J., and Odusami, K.T. (2010). “Professionals’ ambivalence toward ethics in the Nigerian 514 
construction industry.” J. Profl. Issues Eng. Educ. Pract., 136 (1), 9-15. 515 
Ameyaw, E., Parn, E., Chan, A.P.C., Owusu-Manu, D., Edwards, D.J., and Darko, A. (2017). 516 
“Corrupt practices in the construction industry: Survey of Ghanaian Experience.” J. Manage. 517 
Eng., 33 (6), 1-11. 518 
Arewa, A.O., and Farrell, P. (2015). “The culture of construction organizations: the epitome of 519 
institutionalized corruption.” Const. Econ. Build., 15 (3), 59-71. 520 
Arnold, D.F., Bernardi, R.A., Neidermeyer, P.E., and Schmee, J. (2007). “The effect of country and 521 
culture on perceptions of appropriate ethical actions prescribed by codes of conduct: A Western 522 
European perspective among Accountants.” J. Bus. Ethics, 70(4), 327-340. 523 
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners (2016). “Report to the Nations on Occupational Fraud and 524 
Abuse.” ⟨http://www.acfe.com/rttn2016/docs/2016-report-to-the-nations⟩ (Nov. 6, 2018). 525 
Bowen, P.A., Edwards, P.J., and Cattel, K. (2012). “Corruption in the South African Construction 526 
industry: A thematic analysis of verbatim comments from survey participants.” Constr. 527 
Manage. Econ., 30 (10), 885-901. 528 
Bowen, P.A., Akintoye, A., Pearl, R., and Edwards, P.J. (2007). “Ethical behavior in the South 529 
African Construction Industry.” Constr. Manage. Econ., 25 (6), 631-648. 530 
Büte, M. (2011). “The effects of nepotism and favoritism on employee behaviors and human resource 531 
practices: A research on Turkish Public Banks.” Todaie’s Rev. Pub. Admin., 5(1), 185-208. 532 
Christie, P., Ik-Whan, J., Kwon, G., Stoebert, P., and Baumhart, R. (2003). “A cross-cultural 533 
comparison of ethical attitudes of business managers.” J. Bus. Ethics, 46(3), 263-287. 534 
CIOB (2010). “Code of Practice for Project Management for Construction and Development.” 4th edn. 535 
Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell. 536 
Creswell, J. (2014). “Research design: Qualitative, quantitative and mixed methods approach.” 4th ed., 537 
Los Angeles (CA): Sage Publications. 538 
Delbridge, A. (2000). “Macquarie Dictionary.” Macquarie Point, N.S.W. 539 
de Jong, M., Henry, W.P., and Stansbury, N. (2009). “Eliminating corruption in our 540 
engineering/construction industry.” Leadersh. Manage. Eng., 9(3), 105-111. 541 
De Vaus, D. (2002). “Analysing social science data—50 key problems in data analysis.” SAGE   542 
          Publications: Thousand Oaks, CA, USA. 543 
Fellows, R., and Liu, A. (2008). “Research methods for construction.” 3rd ed. Chichester: Blackwell 544 
Publishing. 545 
Field, A. (2013). “Discovering statistics using IBM SPSS statistic.” 4th ed. Los Angeles (CA): Sage 546 
Publications. 547 
Good Practice Note (2006). “Non-discrimination and equal opportunity.” 548 
⟨http://www.ifc.org/enviropublications⟩ (Oct. 17, 2018). 549 
Ho, C.M.F. (2011). “Ethics management for the construction industry: A review of ethical decision- 550 
making literature.” Eng. Constr. Archit.  Manage., 18 (5), 516-537. 551 
Jackson, B. (2004). “The perceptions of experienced construction practitioners regarding ethical 552 
transgressions in the construction industry.” Int. J. Constr. Educ. Res., 1(2), 1-10. 553 
Jackson, T. (2000). “Making ethic judgements: A cross-cultural management study.” Asia Pac. J. 554 
Manage., 17(3), 443-472. 555 
Joyce, P. (2014). “The culture of ethics that the public sector needs.” 556 
⟨http://www.governing.com/columns/smart-mgmt/col-cultureethics⟩ (Aug. 20, 2018). 557 
Kang, B.G., Long, K., Zhang, C., and Hao, J.L. (2017). “Comparative study on the ethical perceptions 558 
of contractors and designers in the China construction industry.” IOP Conf. Series, Materials 559 
Science and Engineering, 291, 1-7. 560 
Kang, B.G. (2009). “Principles and practices of construction ethics management: With a comparative 561 
study between the UK and Korea.” VDM Verlag Müller Publishing, Germany. 562 
Kenny, C. (2009). “Transport Construction, corruption and developing countries.” Transp. Rev., 29 563 
(1), 21-41. 564 
Kernel (2011). “Stop misuse of organizational resources through Spyware tools.” 565 
⟨http://www.pressexposure.org⟩ (Oct. 17, 2018). 566 
Kuntz, J.R.C., Kuntz, J.R., Elenkov, D., and Nabirukhina, A. (2013). “Characterising ethical cases: A 567 
cross-cultural investigation of individual differences, organizational climate, and leadership on 568 
ethical decision-making.” J.  Bus. Ethics, 113(2), 317-331. 569 
Le, Y., Shan, M., Chan, A.P.C., and Hu, Y. (2014). “Investigating the causal relationships between 570 
causes of and vulnerabilities to corruption in the Chinese public construction sector.” J. Constr. 571 
Eng. Manage., 140 (9), 1-11. 572 
Liao, S.S.C. (2013). “Enhancing ethics and the competitive environment by accounting for conflict of 573 
interest in project procurement.” Leadersh. Manage. Eng., 13 (2), 86-95. 574 
Loosemore, M., and Lim, B. (2015). “Inter-organizational unfairness in the construction industry.” 575 
Constr. Manage. Econ., 33 (4), 310-326. 576 
Maicibi, N.A., and Yahaya, S.A. (2013). “Criminal and unethical behaviors in organizations: misuse 577 
of assets and false or misleading advertising.” Global J. Hum. Soc. Sc. Pol. Sci., 13 (1), 1-11. 578 
Mason, J. (2009). “Ethics in the construction industry: the prospects for a single professional code.” 579 
Int. J. Law Built Environ, 1 (3), 194-204. 580 
May, D., Wilson, O., and Skitmore, M. (2001). “Bid cutting: An empirical study of practice in South-581 
East Queensland.” Eng. Constr. Archit. Manage., 8 (4), 250-256. 582 
Moodley, K., Smith, N., and Preece, C.N. (2008). “Stakeholder matrix for ethical relationships in the 583 
construction industry.” Constr. Manage. Econ., 26 (6), 625-632. 584 
Mukumbwa, B., and Muya, M. (2013). “Ethics in the construction industry in Zambia.” Int. J. Constr. 585 
Manage., 13 (2), 43-65. 586 
Mutlu, K. (2000). “Problems of nepotism and favoritism in the police organization in Turkey.” Pol. 587 
Int. J. Pol. Strat. Manage., 23(3), 381-389. 588 
Oladinrin, O.T., and Ho, C.M.F (2016). “Critical enablers for codes of ethics implementation in 589 
construction organizations.” J. Manage. Eng., 32 (1), 1-10. 590 
Oladinrin, O.T., and Ho, C.M.F (2014). “Strategies for improving codes of ethics implementation in 591 
construction organizations.” Proj. Manage. J., 45 (5), 15-26.  592 
Osei-Tutu, E., Badu, E., and Owusu-Manu, D. (2010). “Exploring corruption practices in public 593 
procurement of infrastructure projects in Ghana.” Int. J. Manage. Proj. Bus., 3 (2), 236-256. 594 
Pelletier, K.L., and Bligh, M.C. (2008). “The aftermath of organizational corruption: Employee 595 
attributions and emotional reactions.” J. Bus. Ethics, 80(4), 823-844. 596 
Perry, J.L., de Graaf, G., van der Wal, Z., and van Montfort, C. (2014). “Returning to Our Roots: 597 
Good Government Evolves to Good Governance.” Pub. Admin. Rev. 74 (1), 27 – 28 598 
Poon, J., and Hoxley, M. (2010). “Use of moral theory to analyse the ethical codes of built 599 
environment professional organizations: A case study of the Royal Institution of Chartered 600 
Surveyors.” Int. J. Law Built Environ., 2 (3), 260-275. 601 
Runde, D.F., Hameed, S., and Magpile, J. (2014). “The costs of corruption.” 602 
⟨http://csis.org/files/publication/140204_Hameed_CostsOfCorruption_Web.pdf⟩ (Jul. 30, 603 
2015).  604 
Schwab, K. (2013). “The Global competitiveness report 2013-2014.” 605 
⟨http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalCompetitivenessReport_2013-14.pdf⟩ (Jul. 30, 606 
2015).  607 
Sezer, O., Gino, F., and Bazerman, M.H. (2015). “Ethical blind spots: explaining unintentional ethical 608 
behavior.” Cur. Opin. Psych., 6, 77-81. 609 
Shakantu, W. (2006). “Corruption in the construction industry: forms, susceptibility and possible 610 
solutions.”  J. South African Inst. Civ. Eng., 14 (7), pp. 43-44. 611 
Skibniewski, M.J., and Ghosh, S. (2009). “Determination of key performance indicators with 612 
enterprise resource planning systems in engineering construction firms.” J. Constr.  613 
          Eng. Manage., 135, 965–978. 614 
Sohail, M., and Cavill, S. (2008). “Accountability to prevent corruption in construction projects.” J. 615 
Constr. Eng. Manage., 134 (9), 729-738. 616 
Suen, H., Cheung, S.O., and Mondejar, R. (2007). “Managing ethical behavior in construction 617 
organizations in Asia: How do the teachings of Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism and 618 
Globalization influence ethics management?” Int. J. Proj. Manage., 25, 257-265. 619 
Transparency International (2014). “Bribe payers index 2011.”  620 
⟨http://files.transparency.org/content/download/98/395/2011_BPI_EN.pdf⟩ (Jul. 30, 2015).  621 
Transparency International (2014). “Corruption perceptions index 2014.” 622 
⟨http://files.transparency.org/content/download/1856/12434/file/2014_CPIBrochure_EN.pdf⟩ 623 
(Jul. 30, 2015).  624 
Vee, C., and Skitmore, C. (2003). “Professional ethics in the construction industry.” Eng, Constr. 625 
Archit. Manage., 10 (2), 117-127. 626 
Vitell, S.J., and Hidalgo, E.R. (2006). “The impact of corporate ethical values and enforcement of 627 
ethical codes on the perceived importance of ethics in business: A comparison of U.S. and 628 
Spanish Managers.” J. Bus. Ethics, Vol. 64(1), pp. 31-43. 629 
Wilks, D.C. (2011). “Attitudes towards unethical behaviors in organizational settings: an empirical 630 
study.” Ethics Prog. Quart., 2(2), 9-22. 631 
Table 1. Respondent demographic information (N=266) 632 
 Demographic information Frequency Percent 
Role   
Estate Surveyor/Valuer 76 28.6 
Quantity Surveyor 70 26.3 
Land Surveyor/Geomatic Engineer 108 40.6 
Other e.g. cartographer 6 2.3 
Non-response 6 2.3 
    
Education   
Pre-degree education (i.e. basic education, 
secondary education, diploma and higher 
national diploma)     
32 12.0 
Bachelor's degree 112 42.1 
Postgraduate degree (i.e. masters’ degree and 
doctorate degree) 
116 43.6 
Non-response 6 2.3 
    
Professional Experience   
0-10 years 116 43.6 
11-20 years 78 29.3 
Over 20 years 69 25.9 
Non-response 3 1.1 
 633 
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 635 
 636 
 637 
 638 
 639 
 640 
 641 
 642 
 643 
 644 
 645 
 646 
Table 2. Stakeholder ability to influence improvement in unethical practices 647 
Unethical Practice Stakeholder N Mean Sore 
(MS) 
Std. Deviation 
(SD) 
Std. Error 
(SE) 
Rank by mean 
score 
Failure to Protect Public Health, Safety and Welfare Individual Professional 266 3.15 1.286 0.079 3 
company 266 3.32 1.314 0.081 1 
Professional association 266 3.30 1.327 0.081 2 
Collusion Individual Professional 266 3.04 1.444 0.089 3 
Company 266 3.09 1.301 0.080 1 
Professional association 266 3.08 1.316 0.081 2 
Mishandling of Sensitive Data (e.g.  Leakages) Individual Professional 266 3.19 1.514 0.093 2 
Company 266 3.30 1.296 0.079 1 
Professional association 266 3.08 1.343 0.082 3 
Production of Fraudulent Documents (e.g. invoices & claims) Individual Professional 266 2.95 1.688 0.104 2 
Company 266 3.06 1.474 0.090 1 
Professional association 266 2.87 1.516 0.093 3 
Failure to Protect Environment Individual Professional 266 3.00 1.373 0.084 3 
Company 266 3.18 1.221 0.075 1 
Professional association 266 3.09 1.323 0.081 2 
Bribery Individual Professional 266 3.05 1.687 0.103 2 
Company 266 3.22 1.373 0.084 1 
Professional association 266 3.03 1.432 0.088 3 
Improper Relations with Other Parties (e.g. Excessive gifts) Individual Professional 266 2.97 1.467 0.090 2 
Company 266 3.04 1.280 0.078 1 
Professional association 266 2.94 1.306 0.080 3 
Abuse of Company Resources Individual Professional 266 3.09 1.598 0.098 2 
Company 266 3.27 1.350 0.083 1 
Professional association 266 2.87 1.324 0.081 3 
Abuse of Client Resources Individual Professional 266 2.94 1.626 0.100 2 
Company 266 3.08 1.397 0.086 1 
Professional association 266 2.89 1.424 0.087 3 
Discrimination and Nepotism Individual Professional 266 2.88 1.626 0.100 3 
Company 266 3.22 1.451 0.089 1 
Professional association 266 3.04 1.433 0.088 2 
Misrepresentation of Competence Individual Professional 266 2.97 1.538 0.094 3 
Company 266 3.21 1.354 0.083 1 
Professional association 266 3.16 1.457 0.089 2 
Political Interference Individual Professional 266 2.62 1.447 0.089 3 
Company 266 3.29 1.377 0.084 2 
Professional association 266 3.34 1.373 0.084 1 
Note: Scale: 1 = not at all; 2 = low; 3 = moderate; 4 = high; 5 = very high. 
 648 
 649 
 650 
 651 
 652 
 653 
 654 
Table 3. One-way ANOVA test for stakeholders' ability to influence improvement in unethical 655 
practice 656 
Unethical practice Comparison Sum of Squares df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Abuse of company 
resources 
Between Groups 21.844 2 10.922 6.104a 0.002 
Within Groups 1624.119 527 2.043   
Total 1645.963 529    
Discrimination and 
nepotism 
Between Groups 16.007 2 8.004 3.403a 0.030 
Within Groups 1802.439 528 2.267   
Total 1818.446 530    
Political interference Between Groups 85.573 2 42.787 21.848 0.034 
Within Groups 1556.942 795 1.958   
Total 1642.515 797    
Note: a Welch’s F is used due to significant difference in group variances 
 657 
 658 
Table 4. Tukey post hoc test multiple comparisons table for stakeholders' ability to influence 659 
improvement in unethical practice 660 
Unethical 
practice 
Stakeholder (I) Stakeholder (J) Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. 
Error 
Sig. 95% Confidence 
Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Abuse of 
company 
resources 
  
  
  
  
  
Individual 
Professional 
Company -0.181 0.124 0.309 -0.47 0.11 
Professional 
body 
0.223 0.124 0.170 -0.07 0.51 
Company Individual 
Professional 
0.181 0.124 0.309 -0.11 0.47 
Professional 
body 
0.405a 0.124 0.003 0.11 0.70 
Professional 
association 
Individual 
Professional 
-0.223 0.124 0.170 -0.51 0.07 
Company -0.405a 0.124 0.003 -0.70 -0.11 
Discrimination 
and nepotism 
  
  
  
  
  
Individual 
Professional 
Company -0.347a 0.131 0.022 -0.65 -0.04 
Professional 
body 
-0.161 0.131 0.432 -0.47 0.15 
Company Individual 
Professional 
0.347a 0.131 0.022 0.04 0.65 
Professional 
body 
0.185 0.131 0.332 -0.12 0.49 
Professional 
association 
Individual 
Professional 
0.161 0.131 0.432 -0.15 0.47 
Company -0.185 0.131 0.332 -0.49 0.12 
Political 
interference 
  
  
  
  
  
Individual 
Professional 
Company -0.670a 0.121 0.000 -0.96 -0.39 
Professional 
body 
-0.717a 0.121 0.000 -1.00 -0.43 
Company Individual 
Professional 
0.670a 0.121 0.000 0.39 0.96 
Professional 
body 
-0.046 0.121 0.923 -0.33 0.24 
Professional 
association 
Individual 
Professional 
0.717a 0.121 0.000 0.43 1.00 
Company 0.046 0.121 0.923 -0.24 0.33 
Note: a The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level 
Table 5. One-way ANOVA test for stakeholders' ability to influence improvement in unethical 661 
practice (Ghana sample) 662 
Unethical practice Comparison Sum of Squares df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Abuse of company 
resources 
Between Groups 31.335 2 15.668 9.727a 0.000 
Within Groups 669.885 238 1.861   
Total 701.221 240    
Discrimination and 
nepotism 
Between Groups 17.915 2 8.957 4.032a 0.019 
Within Groups 826.137 239 2.295   
Total 844.051 241    
Political 
interference 
Between Groups 62.483 2 31.242 15.409 0.000 
Within Groups 729.892 360 2.027   
Total 792.375 362    
Note: a Welch's F is used due to significant difference in group variances  
 663 
Table 6. Tukey post hoc test multiple comparisons table for stakeholders' ability to influence 664 
improvement in unethical practice (Ghana sample) 665 
Unethical 
practice 
Stakeholder (I) Stakeholder (J) Mean 
Difference,  
(I-J) 
Std. 
Error 
Sig. 95% Confidence 
Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Abuse of 
company 
resources 
  
  
  
  
  
Individual 
Professional 
Company -0.339 0.175 0.131 -0.75 0.07 
Professional 
association 
0.380 0.175 0.078 -0.03 0.79 
Company Individual 
Professional 
0.339 0.175 0.131 -0.07 0.75 
Professional 
association 
0.719a 0.175 0.000 0.31 1.13 
Professional 
association 
Individual 
Professional 
-0.380 0.175 0.078 -0.79 0.03 
Company -0.719a 0.175 0.000 -1.13 -0.31 
Discrimination 
and nepotism 
  
  
  
  
  
Individual 
Professional 
Company -0.521a 0.195 0.021 -0.98 -0.06 
Professional 
association 
-0.123 0.195 0.802 -0.58 0.34 
Company Individual 
Professional 
0.521a 0.195 0.021 0.06 0.98 
Professional 
association 
0.397 0.195 0.104 -0.06 0.86 
Professional 
association 
Individual 
Professional 
0.123 0.195 0.802 -0.34 0.58 
Company -0.397 0.195 0.104 -0.86 0.06 
Political 
interference 
  
  
  
  
  
Individual 
Professional 
Company -0.992a 0.183 0.000 -1.42 -0.56 
Professional 
association 
-.688a 0.183 0.001 -1.12 -0.26 
Company Individual 
Professional 
0.992a 0.183 0.000 0.56 1.42 
Professional 
association 
0.304 0.183 0.223 -0.13 0.73 
Professional 
association 
Individual 
Professional 
0.688a 0.183 0.001 0.26 1.12 
Company -0.304 0.183 0.223 -0.73 0.13 
Note: a The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.  
 666 
Table 7. One-way ANOVA test for stakeholders' ability to influence improvement in unethical 667 
practice (Nigeria Sample)  668 
Unethical 
practice 
Comparison Sum of Squares df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Political 
interference 
Between Groups 23.046 2 11.523 6.314 0.002 
Within Groups 465.394 255 1.825   
Total 488.439 257    
 669 
Table 8. Tukey post hoc test multiple comparisons table for stakeholders' ability to influence 670 
improvement in unethical practice (Nigeria sample) 671 
Unethical 
practice 
Stakeholder (I) Stakeholder (J) Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. 
Error 
Sig. 95% Confidence Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Political 
interference 
Individual 
Professional 
Company -0.283 0.206 0.357 -0.77 0.20 
Professional 
association 
-0.726a 0.206 0.001 -1.21 -0.24 
Company Individual 
Professional 
0.283 0.206 0.357 -0.20 0.77 
Professional 
association 
-0.443 0.206 0.082 -0.93 0.04 
Professional 
association 
Individual 
Professional 
0.726a 0.206 0.001 0.24 1.21 
Company 0.443 0.206 0.082 -0.04 0.93 
Note: a The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.  
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Table 9. One-way ANOVA test for stakeholders' ability to influence improvement in unethical 674 
practice (Tanzania sample) 675 
Unethical 
practice 
Comparison Sum of Squares df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Political 
interference 
Between 
Groups 
18.601 2 9.301 4.736 0.010 
Within 
Groups 
341.694 174 1.964   
Total 360.295 176    
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Table 10. Tukey post hoc test multiple comparisons table for stakeholders' ability to influence 679 
improvement in unethical practice (Tanzania sample) 680 
Unethical practice Stakeholder 
(I) 
Stakeholder 
(J) 
Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. 
Error 
Sig. 95% Confidence 
Interval 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Political interference Individual 
Professional 
Company -0.576 0.258 0.068 -1.19 0.03 
Professional 
association 
-0.761a 0.258 0.010 -1.37 -0.15 
Company Individual 
Professional 
0.576 0.258 0.068 -0.03 1.19 
Professional 
association 
-0.185 0.258 0.754 -0.79 0.42 
Professional 
association 
Individual 
Professional 
0.761a 0.258 0.010 0.15 1.37 
Company 0.185 0.258 0.754 -0.42 0.79 
Note: a The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.  
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Appendix A: Questionnaire 684 
 
Section 1: Please provide the following background Information. Please tick the most appropriate box 
Professional Role 
□ Estate Surveyor/Valuer    □  Quantity Surveyor   
□  Land Surveyor/Geomatic engineer □  Other, specify:____________   
Highest level of Education 
□ Basic education □ Secondary education □ Diploma   □ Higher national 
diploma     
□ Bachelor’s Degree   □ Master’s Degree □  Doctorate Degree   
Length of Professional 
Experience (years) 
□ 0-10       □ 11-20      □ 21-30      □ 31-40     □  Over 40  
 685 
Section 2: Please rate the extent to which you feel, you (individual professional), your organization and 
your affiliated national surveying professional body can influence improvement (i.e. bring about 
positive change) in the following practices. Rate using the following scale: 
1 = Not at all; 2 = Low; 3 = Moderate; 4 = High; 5 = Very High 
Professional Organisation Professional 
Body 
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 
Failure to Protect Public Health, Safety and Welfare  □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Collusion □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Mishandling of Sensitive Data (e.g.  Leakages) □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Production of Fraudulent Documents (e.g. invoices & 
claims) 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Failure to Protect Environment □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Bribery □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Improper Relations with Other Parties (e.g. Excessive gifts) □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Abuse of Company Resources □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Abuse of Client Resources □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Discrimination and Nepotism □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Misrepresentation of Competence □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Political Interference □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
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